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ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT STRATEGIES FOR ZIMBABWE 
Roger C. R idde ll* *
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Last week in an address to the European Parliament in Strasburg, the EEC 
Commissioner, Mr. Roy Jenkins, warned parliamentarians that "we face no less 
than the break-up of the established economic and social order on which post­
war Europe was b u ilt ." But it  is  not only the industria lised world which faces 
c r is is  as we begin the 1980s. The rapidly ris in g  foreign debt of third world 
nations from $74 b illio n  in 1970 to a staggering $321 b illio n  in 1978 and the 
seemingly endless rise  in o il prices have stifled  the economic policies for 
many third world nations. At the same time, the last few years have seen a 
marked increase in economic protectionist policies by the industrialised 
nations of the world in the face of what they see as the threat of competitive 
imports from third world nations, in particular, the newly industrialised 
nations. And for the future, the s ilicon  chip revolution w ill not only 
challenge the employment policies of industria lised nation governments, i t  w ill 
also herald - and indeed is  already starting to herald - a marked change in the 
operations of transnational corporations and in particular their decision to 
invest in peripheral economies such as our own.
My reason for drawing your attention to recent changes in and predictions for 
the world economy can be simply stated. To discuss the economic future of 
Zimbabwe at the present time, less than two weeks before the common ro ll 
election and with no guarantee of a return to peace, would be d if f ic u lt  enough 
against a background of a re lative ly  stable and predictable world economic 
order. But to make such an attempt against the background of an unstable and 
uncertain world economy would worry the most hardened sooth-sayer, never mind 
an economist.
And for th is country in particular, we are faced with uncertainty and with a 
whole series of c r it ica l questions which would need to be answered before we 
could begin to predict with any accuracy the future pattern of development in 
Zimbabwe. Who w ill win the election, and i f  there is  no outright majority 
what sort of coalition w ill be formed? Will the right or le ft  wing factions 
of the party or parties to government dictate policy? How much sta b ility  w ill 
the new government have? Will the war end and i f  not w ill the nature of the 
war change and what resources w ill the new government have to channel to the 
war? Will there be a coup? What stance w ill the Front Line States, South 
Africa and the wider international community take in the short and medium term? 
How far w ill an escalating guerilla  war in South Africa affect the economy of 
Zimbabwe? What po litica l and/or m ilitary solutions w ill emerge in Namibia? 
What effect would economic sanctions imposed on South Africa by either a ll 
member states of the United Nations or member states of the OAU have on the 
Zimbabwean economy? And further afie ld , how w ill the changing nature of the 
economies of the industrialized world affect a future Zimbabwe?
Within the context of many uncertainties, both national and international, 
Zimbabwe seems to be faced with two alternative development strategies for the 
future, one cap ita list  oriented and one so c ia list  oriented. Of course to say 
th is is  not to say very much for on a theoretical level a whole variety of 
economic structures and policies and goals of governments can be envisaged
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under an economy based either on the price system or on a system of central 
planning. Thus I w ill make an assumption, based on both the experience of th is 
country and patterns of development in other developing countries that Zimbabwe 
is currently faced with either a development strategy based on a cap ita list  
oriented mixed economy, which w ill build on the present economic base and 
attempt to develop its  links with the western industrialized world and a develop­
ment strategy based on the transition to socialism aimed at altering the present 
economic structure and lessening it s  dependence upon the western industrialized 
world. I shall also assume in accord with party manifestoes and commitments 
made by po litica l parties, that there are a set of common goals which a ll 
parties wish to achieve. These include the establishment of a non-racTaT state
and the rapid promotion of s k i l l s  within the black community, rapid economic 
growth, a redistribution of land and the achievement of adequate education, jobs 
and basic social services for a ll.
After outlining some of the major economic problems facing the country at the 
present time, I w ill attempt to look at how these problems might be addressed 
under the cap ita list  oriented mixed economy and under the transition to 
socialism. In doing th is I shall assume the best of a ll possible worlds: 
that the war w ill end and that the new government w ill be stable and strong 
enough to pursue it s  development goals with a minimum of international inter­
ference. Insofar as these assumptions are not met in the real world, the 
different strategies w ill be faced with increasing problems of implementation.
But even on the best assumptions, both strategies w ill be faced with major - 
although different - problems, Zimbabwe's economic structure is  export oriented, 
dependent upon foreign capital and on the plentiful supply of cheap labour. 
Economic policies of successive governments have encouraged foreign investment 
which has assisted the growth of commercial agriculture, mining and manufac­
turing. In 1965, when UDI was declared, exports were valued at 56% of gross 
domestic product, imports at 46%. 68% of net profits accrued to foreign
companies, r is in g  to over 90% in the mining sector. I t  was th is openness of 
the economy which led B rit ish  policy-makers to believe that economic sanctions 
would bring the Rhodesian rebellion to an end. However, partly because of the 
slowness with which international sanctions were applied, partly because South 
Africa did not comply and f in a lly  because western governments failed to apply 
sanctions with the necessary muscle, the Rhodesian economy survived and achieved 
high growth rates up to 1975. She was able to switch export markets and
introduce new export products. To preserve scarce foreign exchange, vigorous 
import substitution policies were introduced and government was able to directly 
influence the direction of investment. At UDI the respective shares of GDP were 
manufacturing 18,6%, commercial agriculture 20,6% and mining 7,2%. By 1975 
manufacturing had overtaken agriculture and was responsible for 24% of GDP, the 
number of products produced increasing over sixfo ld  in the post-UDI period. In 
spite of sanctions, foreign capital has continued to flow into Zimbabwe, 
averaging over $30 m illion a year and the government has been able to raise 
loans on international currency markets. By 1978 exports were valued at $600 
m illion, 27% of GDP and imports at $420 m illion, 19% of GDP. Between 1965 and 
1976 the real growth rate of the economy was 7,5% per year.
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Since 1975, a combination of the war, world recession, the r ise  in o il prices 
and a marked decrease in the terms of trade, real growth rates have been consis­
tently negative. In real terms, GDP fe ll by 13,4% in the four year period 
1975 to 1978 and remained steady in 1979.
Zimbabwe's present pattern of development, with it s  emphasis on high growth rates 
in the modern sectors of the economy has created major structural problems in
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the c r it ic a lly  important areas of land, employment, wage d istribution, patterns 
of consumption and in access to social services such as education, health and 
social security. In a situation not uncharacteristic of many middle-income 
developing countries, but made worse by decades of racial legislation  and 
practice, economic growth in Zimbabwe benefitted a small and largely white 
e lite ; the benefits of growth have not been redistributed to the majority of 
the black population.
The land problem in Zimbabwe does not l ie  so much in the inequalities in access 
to land per se, but because inequalities in access to land are accompanied by 
growing overpopulation,landlessness, land deterioration and increasing poverty 
in the African areas alongside serious underutilisation of land in the formerly 
European areas. Under the present system of mixed (arable and livestock) 
fanning practised in the TTLs, the available productive land is  able to carry 
some 275 000 farming units, providing a modest (i.e. low) income and given 
present levels of capitalisation. Yet the TTLs currently carry about 700 000 
units, two and a half times the safe number. Although no national figures of 
landlessness are available, sample studies carried out five  years ago in the 
south east of the country showed that 40% of rural men aged between 16 and 30 
had no land. Over 17 times as much land is  currently being used for arable 
cultivation; th is land has been taken over from the grazing areas, 50% of which 
is estimated to be bare or heavily over-grazed. Each year the land is  becoming 
less and less productive.
In contrast, large areas of formerly European land are either unused or under­
utilised ; a figure of at least 60% of total European land could be classified  
as unused and underutilised. In addition, a range of direct and indirect 
subsidies help to keep white farmers on the land; in spite of these, the RNFU 
estimated in mid-1978 that 40% of white farmers were insolvent. The impressive 
production figures for white agriculture, a twentyfold increase since 1945, 
conceal considerable inefficiencies within the sub-sector.
With few job opportunities in the rural areas, blacks have increasingly sought 
employment in the modern sectors of the economy. In the 13 year period 1966 to 
1978, each year 178 000 black children either le ft school or were old enough to 
do so had they completed their education. In the same period only 20 000 new 
jobs were created each year and in the years of most rapid economic growth,
1969 to 1974, the number of new jobs for blacks only increased at 33 000 per 
year. Even when allowances are made for mortality, retirement and those not 
looking for work, the economy has not been able to provide anything like  fu ll 
employment. And in the past few years, employment levels have fallen by over 
30 000, so increasing the backlog of unemployed blacks.
For those blacks who find employment, most receive extremely low wages and the 
absolute wage gap between the re lative ly  small number of highly-paid employees 
and the high number of low-paid unskilled and sem i-skilled blacks is  increasing 
In 1977, average black wages were $589 a year, 10% of average white wages of 
$6 155 a year. In that year, 86% of a ll black employees outside white agri­
culture received cash wages of less than $90 a month, below the poverty datum 
line income for a family of s ix  people. For agricultural workers on white 
farms, wage levels are even lower.
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Wage d iffe rentia ls have had a marked effect on the structure of consumer demand 
in the economy. A large proportion of new products produced since UDI, for 
example, have been luxury products. For example the ARnI register shows the 
production of the following goods: high quality furniture, lo llipop  sticks,
canned asparagus, bird seed, fifteen varieties of hair shampoo, ten different 
hand cleaners, five  varieties of lip st ic k , seven varieties of swimming pool 
paints, ten varieties of pet food and many more.
Access to social services are characterised by a sim ilar maldistribution. The 
present state health service is based on an urban and hospital-based curative 
system, biased in favour of the more affluent sectors of the population. The 
same pattern is  true for education. While white children have trad itionally 
received education up to the age of 16 years, 25% of black children do not start 
school, and over 60% do not complete fu ll primary education. The primary 
schooling system is  geared to secondary schooling but only 4% of black children 
complete four years of secondary education, while until recently, 50% of a ll 
blacks with post-primary education were either unemployed or doing jobs well 
below their educational ab ility .
Paying for the escalating war has added an increasing burden to state financing, 
while the growing in ab ility  of the government to pay for the war out of revenue 
collection has led to an increasing dependence on state borrowing. In the la st 
financial year, the government had to borrow $370 m illion  to meet it s  expenditure 
commitments; this was 16% of GDP. In the current financial year, government 
is  planning to borrow $454 m illion, amounting to 42% of total current expenditure. 
Declared government borrowing w ill have doubled the country's gross public debt 
in the years 1978 to 1980, while B ritish  Government sources have recently been 
informed that Rhodesia has been borrowing about $400 m illion a year from South 
Africa to help meet current expenditure commitment.
More v is ib ly , the war has led to the destruction of much of the countryside and 
the rural economy: schools, c lin ic s ,  cattle, dips and stores have been destroyed,
roads have fallen into d isrepair, hundreds of thousands of cattle have died or 
been affected by tsetse f ly , tickborne and other diseases. It  is estimated 
that over one m illion  people have been displaced by the war, while the shortage 
of adequate food supplies have led to dramatic increases in malnutrition in many 
rural areas.
Although time does not permit a more comprehensive analysis of the economic 
problems to be faced by incoming governments, i t  is clear from this brief 
overview that the problem thrown up by Rhodesia's past pattern of development 
and more immediately by the war, are sizeable.
We now turn to the future and examine the two different strategies for the 
economy, mentioned above. F irs t  the cap ita list  oriented mixed economy approach. 
Assuming that the war ends and that there is  a government in Zimbabwe committed 
to and able to carry out a cap ita list development strategy, what prospects are 
there for solving the problems of the present economy?
A number of studies have been made in recent months which examine the prospects 
for economic growth and expansion with the removal of sanctions. One of the 
most rigorous of these was carried out by Rhodesian economist, Duncan Clarke, at
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the end of last year.
Clarke makes a number of assumptions favourable to the growth of the export 
oriented cap ita list  economy. These include: maximum effect from the lift in g  
of sanctions is  achieved and the fu ll .20% discount benefit on trade value accrues 
immediately to the economy; the terms of trade cease to deteriorate; net 
private capital inflows resume at their early 1970 level; only one year is 
needed for post-war reconstruction; o ffic ia l b ilateral and multilateral aid 
flows increase while foreign debt repayment also increases; in v isib le  earnings 
on current account increase with a resumption of trade with Zambia and Mozam­
bique; the economy is  able to finance increased import levels, to absorb new 
capital and to replace old capital and to build up foreign currency reserves; 
the economy is  not subject to drought or natural disaster to divert the course 
of sustained growth and f in a lly  in future years the rate of inflation can be 
controlled. In short, he assumes the most optim istic set of circumstances 
favourable to economic growth.
Working with these assumptions, Clarke estimates that the economy would grow 
over the next ten years at a rate of 3% a year or at best S% a year, in real 
terms. With the 3% path, the h istorical peak of GDP reached in 1974 is  
passed again 5 years after independence, with the 5% path, two years after 
independence. As welfare at large is connected to per capita levels, and 
assuming an increase in population of 3% a year in the ten year period, even 
on the high growth rate assumption, GDP per capita would not reach the 1974 peak 
until 1990.
Clarke warns: "there is  a real need not to underestimate the structural effects
of past and existing policy as well as some terrib le consequences of the war. 
Chronic unemployment, landlessness, urban and rural poverty, inequality and the 
high level of external influence in the economy - a ll of which have been long 
evident - w ill not dissolve merely through sanctions removal. Nor w ill they 
wither simply with projections of past growth trajectories - no matter what 
their rate".
A more optim istic projection of economic growth under a cap ita list oriented 
strategy is  found in the "proposals for a five year progranme for development 
in the public sector", published in January last year and broadly accepted by 
the previous government. Two assumptions of this plan are that "the develop­
ment of the private enterprise economy is  important because it  is  the basis for 
a ll else" and that "as interest on foreign development loans w ill have to be 
serviced and capital replaced, i t  is  imperative that the commercial sector of 
agriculture (and other leading sectors RR) be encouraged to produce surpluses of 
exportable commodities at a p ro fit." The proposals attempt to address some of 
the problems of unemployment, landlessness and lack of adequate social services 
outlined above. The total cost of this massive public sector investment 
progranme is $3,5 b illio n , costed at 1977 prices; total investment at year 1 
is  estimated to be $360 m illion r is in g  to $826 m illion at year 5. The proposals 
estimate rates of growth of the economy as: 3% year 1, 5% year 2 and 8% in
years 3, 4 and 5. It  is  also estimated that there w ill be an increase in 
employment of 350 000 in the 5 year period, averaging 70 000 a year.
Even i f  these proposals could be implemented (and costs of rural reconstruction 
are ignored), the estimated rise  in employment levels in the modern sectors of
166
the economy would s t i l l  not completely absorb the increasing numbers of males 
out of school, never mind address the backlog unemployment problem. In the 
rural areas, resettlement programmes aim to settle  between 5 050 and 11 110 
tribal trust land farmers on 2 m illion hectares of unused and underutilised white 
farm land in five years, a tiny proportion of the excess number of cultivators 
in the TTLs, which the plan estimates to be 277 000. 56 800 plotholders are to
be settled on irriga tion  plots of average size of 0,4 hectares at a total cost 
of $147 m illion. Proposals are put forward for developing those remaining in 
the tribal trust lands, but acute land pressures w ill remain. Indeed the 
largest proportion of finance allocated to rural development in the proposals is  
to go to the commercial agricultural sector, $216 m illion.
However, the proposals are highly unlikely to achieve their stated goals. In 
the f i r s t  place, at current price levels, the proposals are undercosted by 
about 25%; current estimates of the costs would be about $4,4 b illio n , with 
f i r s t  year capital investment of $450 m illion - th is is  equal to total gross 
fixed capital formation for the peak year of 1975 and over twice the current 
level of government capital expenditure. Most of the money for such invest­
ment would have to come from loan finance and the current high levels of state 
borrowing together with the recent doubling of the public debt indicate the 
dangers of such a strategy. It  is  planned that, at current prices, $1,1 
b illio n  would come from foreign aid, while the foreign content of inputs would 
probably raise foreign sourcing to about $2,5 b illio n  in the five  year period. 
The repayment of foreign loans and interest would be dependent upon maintaining 
and increasing present levels of exports. While this is  theoretically possible 
to achieve - assuming the funds were forthcoming and that is  it se lf  a big 
assumption - the experience of other middle-income developing countries in 
recent years shows that in practice foreign debt repayments are like ly  to be 
very d if f ic u lt  to meet. Zimbabwe is  at present in a unique position of having 
considerable f le x ib ilit y  in it s  economic policies because of it s  re lative ly  low 
foreign debt; i t  would seem unwise to rapidly increase her foreign debt to the 
levels implied in these proposals.
But re a lis t ic a lly ,  the proposals have l i t t le  chance of meeting their targets 
because the economy simply does not have the capacity to embark on such a 
massive investment programme. Even i f  she had the required level of s k i l l s ,  
the strains put on the construction sector for example, would be enormous, so 
adding to inflationary tendencies in the economy and leading to worsening terms 
of trade. With increasing numbers of sk illed  white personnel emigrating from 
the country in recent years,the economy is  experiencing a serious shortage of 
professional and technical manpower. For example, in 1969, there were 921 
white construction workers in the economy; between 1977 and 1979 there was a 
net loss of 426, nearly 50% of the 1969 total. Between January and October 
la st year alone the number of journeymen in the building industry in Mashonaland 
and Manicaland (black and white) fe ll by 33% from 732 to 487. In general, in 
the last two years there has been a net loss of 15% of white professional and 
technical workers throughout the economy.
Finally, the plans of any incoming government are like ly  to include far higher 
investment in the social services than the proposals project. For example, 
the proposals only account for state spending on primary schools in the urban 
areas of the country whereas an incoming government is  like ly  to require massive 
state spending on school expansion in the much neglected rural areas.
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Moving away from these specific proposals, a number of other problems and 
tensions which a cap ita list  oriented development path is  like ly  to experience 
can be brie fly  mentioned. The easier i t  is  made for foreign capital to invest 
in Zimbabwe, the greater w ill be the integration of the economy to the western 
industrialized nations and hence the less control a future government w ill have 
to implement national p rio r it ie s. As export expansion may well be hindered by 
increased western protectionism, especially i f  greater attempts are made to 
increase industrial exports, balance of payments problems may be expected. To 
overcome these problems, help would probably be sought from international 
agencies such as the IMF which would demand economic policies opposed to large 
non-profitmaking investment and income redistribution in favour of poorer 
groups. Furthermore, the honeymoon period of the UDI period when government 
held a tight control over the operations and policies of transnational corpo­
rations is  unlikely to be tolerated in the future; the experience of other 
countries shows that more rigorous licensing systems are like ly  to be demanded 
as well as packaged technological transfer arrangements, so increasing foreign 
dependence. In addition, international wage and salary structures demanded 
by TNCs w ill have the effect of increasing or at best maintaining high income 
d ifferentia ls and so continuing the bias towards luxury consumption so apparent 
today. One final lesson from the experience of other middle-income developing 
countries shows that attempts to accelerate the growth rate of the economy and 
then redistribute the benefits of growth to the poorer sectors of the economy 
have, by and large, been ineffective.
We now turn to the scenario which assumes that following the election and with 
the ending of the war, a government is elected in Zimbabwe which is  committed 
to and able to carry out an economic strategy based on the transition to 
socialism. What would be the prospects for solving the problems of the economy.
It  needs to be stated at once that one faces considerable d iff icu lty  both in 
quantifying the like ly  results of such a strategy and also in making direct 
comparisons with the cap ita list development strategy. One reason is  that 
structural changes im plicit in th is approach render inadequate and/or inappro­
priate many sta tist ica l projections based on present economic structures.
Other reasons include uncertainty over the precise course of development to be 
taken under a so c ia list  government, the speed with which changes could occur 
and the amount of resistance to such a strategy that could be expected.
We shall assume that a government committed to a so c ia list  oriented develop­
ment strategy would aim to create an economic system in which the state has 
direct control over a ll major decisions relating to investment, production and 
distribution and where economic growth is  determined by and oriented to national 
needs and p rio r it ie s. This implies for Zimbabwe a sh ift  away from export-led, 
externally dependent growth determined by non-government and often non-national 
decision-makers to a more se lf-re lian t and nationally controlled growth path. 
Economic growth would be geared primarily to mass productive employment, the 
production of mass consumption goods and the provision of adequate land and 
social services. It  can thus be seen that in this strategy many of the 
problems of the present economy - such as landlessness, unemployment and lack 
of access to social services - which the capitalist-oriented strategy would 
attempt to solve primarily through a concentration on economic growth, the 
market mechanism and subsequent redistribution, become national p rio r it ie s and 
goals. Of course this does not a priori make them any easier to solve.
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The UDI economy contains a number of important elements conducive to so c ia list  
planning. For example, the state currently controls,a ll foreign exchange 
dealings under a licensing system and thus d irectly influences that pattern of 
private sector investment decisions. In addition, public sector investment 
constitutes over 40£ of total gross fixed capital formation in the economy.
The state also intervenes directly in the regulation of prices, in the deter­
mination of interest rates, the control of the money supply and bank deposit 
ratios and has in recent years d irectly intervened in the determination of wage 
rates. Under a transition  to socialism one would expect th is type of inter­
vention to continue and probably to be even more comprehensive. One way of 
tightening control, common in many countries embarking on the transition to 
socialism, is  for the state to take over direct control not only of the central 
bank but also of the commercial banks, merchant banks and discount houses, and 
th is step is  like ly  to be taken in a so c ia list  Zimbabwe.
I t  is  in relation to the allocation of resources in the economy, private sector 
investment, the range of products produced and in the production process that 
one would expect major changes to occur. To achieve the p rio ritie s outlined 
above, one would expect there to be substantial reallocation of land to the 
landless and to those with inadequate land holdings, a marked redistribution of 
wealth and income in favour of the low-paid, not only by ra ising  wages of the 
low-paid but also by lowering or at least freezing the wages of the higher paid, 
a marked change in the tax structure and an accompanying sh ift  to the production 
of mass consumption goods and the provision of basic social services. But it  
is  precisely here that the major problems for the transition to socialism arise 
because of the hold that c r it ic a lly  important foreign and local private interests 
have over the present pattern of wealth creation and in the present pattern of 
d istr i bution.
At present in Zimbabwe the production process is dominated by foreign capital 
and technology with national capital closely integrated with and largely 
dependent upon foreign interests. While production is  oriented to export and 
to luxury consumption, i t  is  also, quite obviously, involved in the production 
of basic consumer and household goods and in maintaining and expanding the 
infrastructure. Any moves by the state to 'take over1 the operations of these 
companies or to attempt to change their mode of operation run the r isk s  of 
in it ia tin g  a decline in the production of essential goods, a lowering of employ 
ment levels and the loss of foreign exchange.
As a so c ia list  oriented development strategy would wish to maintain high levels 
of growth, to promote a rapid increase in employment and to demand considerable 
levels of foreign capital and technology inflow (albeit more controlled than at 
present) conflicts are bound to arise. Because of the long history of foreign 
capital and technology penetration into a ll leading sectors of the economy 
together with the cross-link ing across sectors by a number of large companies, 
there is  unlikely to be either a quick or easy transition to state control.
One would rather expect a cautious and piecemeal approach to the control of 
foreign and private national capital.
As a f i r s t  step, however, there would be like ly  to be increased regulation of 
profits with s t r ic t  control over remittances abroad, considerable increases in 
taxation and greater state control over disbursements. This would probably 
be accompanied by demands for fu lle r  disclosures of operations, stric te r control
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over technology transfer tailored more to the changing economic base, strong 
obligation to in it ia te  local training of personnel, demands fo r cross-sectoral 
integration of operations and moves to greater workers' control schemes. In 
practice one would be unlikely to see a rapid withdrawal of transnational 
corporations from a so c ia list  oriented Zimbabwe both because the government w ill 
need the capital, technology and expertise present in the country and also 
because of the large amount of foreign capital invested here - estimated to be 
of the order of $2 000 m illion. Indeed one could expect new contracts to be 
signed. However these contracts are like ly  to be on a case by case basis and 
based on a rigorous bargaining process, with the government attempting to 
obtain a ll the benefits i t  can while ensuring that the corporations w ill not 
pack up and leave.
The type of industrial strategy one could see emerging would include the 
following: attempts to increase cross-industry linkages particularly between
the mining and agricultural and the industrial sectors; the promotion of even 
greater import substitution especially in base chemicals and p lastics production 
and in mining technology and the further inter-link ing of industry with low 
level agricultural inputs such as hoes, ploughs and carts and with products 
from peasant farmers.
Internationally th is is  like ly  to be accompanied by considerable de-linking of 
the economy from South Africa and the promotion of a more integrated Central 
African economy as a rival economic centre to South Africa in line  with policies 
currently under discussion by the Front Line States.
To increase productive employment opportunities in the rural areas, a massive 
rural development programme would be promoted. While th is would be like ly  to 
include many policies sim ilar to those outlined in the Treasury Proposals to 
stimulate growth centres in the rural areas, far less emphasis would be placed 
in capital intensive irriga tion  projects and the promotion of private sector 
commercial agriculture in favour of a widespread land reform programme, 
covering, perhaps, some 3/4 of white land and leaving only the most effic ient 
white farms crucial for local urban food requirements and export earnings.
A comprehensive land reform would, however, face major problems. F irs t ly , 
under the Constitution, large sums of money would be required for land 
acquisition - over $500 m illion  to obtain 75% of white land under current 
prices - although substantial amounts have been promised for such a programme. 
Secondly, such a programme would require both planning and considerable 
expertise. A third problem relates to the location of the underutilised land, 
much of which lie s  adjacent to productively used white land so complicating 
further the planning process. In short, a successful land reform programme 
would require many years to complete and to produce the required effects of 
increased production would also require a whole range of accompanying policies. 
These would include substantial infrastructural developments, the provision of 
a range of necessary inputs, an expanded marketing system and a considerable 
expansion of extension services.
There can be no doubt that a development strategy for Zimbabwe based on the 
transition to socialism  w ill face major problems. These relate both to the 
speed with which policies could be implemented and to the a b ility  of the
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government to achieve it s  economic objectives. One c rit ica l element relates 
to the reaction of the white community - which holds almost a monopoly of high 
level s k i l l s  - to the so c ia list  strategy. In Mozambique there was considerable 
sabotage of the economy by departing whites as the Frelimo government came to 
power. Although one would not expect such rapid changes to come to Zimbabwe 
under a so c ia lis t  government as occurred in Mozambique, the p o ss ib ility  of 
economic sabotage cannot be ignored. But even without sabotage, there would 
certainly be a c r it ica l shortage of high and medium level s k i l l s  facing the 
government. We have already noted that s k il l  constraints would seriously 
affect the ab ility  of a cap ita list  oriented strategy to achieve it s  goals; 
under a so c ia list  strategy these constraints would be even more acute both 
because of the more rapid departure of whites which could be expected and also 
because of the increase in sk illed  personnel needed for the expension of state 
and para-statal bodies under the transition to socialism. An upgrading of 
black workers, the return of thousands of exile Zimbabweans and the expected 
inflow of foreign technicians would ease but certainly not remove th is problem. 
There is  also l i t t le  doubt that in spite of substantial aid flows into 
Zimbabwe - whether there is  a so c ia lis t  or cap ita list oriented government in 
power - the economy under the so c ia list  option would experience foreign exchange 
shortages which would check the speed of implementation of national economic 
goals, lower potential growth and investment and probably lead to a further 
loss of white s k il ls .
These factors would have a direct effect on the sta te 's  a b ilit y  to expand social 
service fa c i l it ie s  such as improved housing, more schools, greater access to 
safe water and to electrical power in the rural areas. However, under a 
Zimbabwean so c ia list  strategy (although this is  not in tr in s ic  to socialism ), 
one could assume that there would be a substantial increase in community se lf- 
help schemes including the building of homes, schools, dams,wells etc.
In spite of these developments, under a so c ia list  strategy for Zimbabwe there 
is  unlikely to be either a short or medium term solution to the economic 
problems of the present economy, while as we have seen, new problems are 
like ly  to emerge.
We have thus to conclude that even on the most favourable assumptions, 
including the emergence of a strong government and the rapid ending of the war, 
there w ill be no solution to the major economic problems facing Zimbabwe for 
many years to come.
Insofar as each strategy succeeds, different groups of people stand to gain. 
The cap ita list strategy is  to absorb more and more people from the residual 
sector into wage employment in the modern sectors of the economy through an 
export-oriented rapid growth policy. The so c ia list  strategy is  to increase 
d irectly the productive capacity of the residual sector through a national 
oriented growth path, based on a substantial redistribution of wealth and 
income.
In the longer term it  is well nigh impossible to predict which strategy would 
succeed, i f  only because 'success' i s  measured in different terms. If ,  however, 
the longer term objective is the achievement of an independent economic 
system aimed at satisfying the essential needs of the masses, then the best
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policy would be to embark on a strategy to achieve the national control of 
resources, to reduce external dependence, and to pursue a high degree of 
se lf-suffic iency in food, the provision of social services and in manufactured 
goods. What this demands is  a substantial restructuring of the economic and 
social systems which exist today.
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